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TITLES TO COAL LAND IN PENN. AND INCIDEN-
TAL MONOPOLIES CONNECTED THEREWITH.
An interesting chapter in the study of the law and one which is
possible to become more interesting, as a commercial factor in the
United States, arises out of the ownership of coal, and titles relating
to coal lands, and the alleged injurious monopoly created thereby in
railroad corporations.
The ease in acquiring title to coal severed from the surface, in
the form of leases, so-called, construed by the courts to be titles in
fee, with no payment of money except by the ton as the coal was
mined, or delivered in cars at the mouth of the tunnel or shaft, made
investment in such property attractive both for corporations and
individuals. It required no increase of capital on that account, and
no payment of money until it was received. The increase of capital
was in the preparation of the coal and delivery in the cars. In early
times it resulted in a monopoly by the railroad interest and large
individual operators by which, through judicious and strategic pur-
chases of land, large bodies of land were controlled without pur-
chase until the market or the will of the operator demanded.
In its early history the question of title was before the courts
of Pennsylvania and received the careful consideration and judg-
ment which all subsequent developments have justified. In all
states of the Union where the common law and the laws of England
regulated titles of land, prior to the Revolution, conveyancing had
been reduced to an almost exact science in England. The formal
deed with its artistically constructed parts controlled the construc-
tion thereof. But in the colonies and subsequent states the free
spirit of America, with its popular ideas of government, communi-
cated itself considerably to busifiess transactions and other depart-
ments of society, and they were restive under forms of any kind,
and wrote their contracts between themselves, with a freedom of
will as well as a free hand. This may have arisen partly from the
natural result of the condition of the" colonists, living far from the
shadow of a landed aristocracy which sought through law and
i6rms, the perpetuation of wealth and real estate in the familI with
ihe iight" of primogeniture. The colonists came beie, with iew;
exceptions, more or less impoveished, valnK freedomi of tbought
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and action above a bound conscience, and preferring a large family
to a perpetual nL.ne secured by the injustice of the old-time
heredity.
When it came to the matter of transfers of the interest' m coal
underlying the surface, which afforded a compensation, with the
title to the farm untouched, the inartistic "agreement," or "lease,"
or "right to mine" or license, as it might have been thought of, arose
with its doubtful significance and not infrequently hybrid character.
The written instrument would call the consideration actually paid,
"rent ;" sometimes "royalty" or "price per ton." It would contain
clauses of distraint, forfeitures for non-payment of rent, with right
of entry and dispossession. The document grew in size, in an
attempt to meet every future emergency, until it became a formida-
ble instrument of many pages.
At an early day the attention of the courts was called to unravel
the dubious character of the so-called leases for coal in the ground
and separate from the surface and sub-soil, which remained in the
grantor. The first case of importance came before the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, and, fraught with difficulties, was so decided
as to place forever a clear and distinct method of construction, and
in its far-reaching results put the rights of coal land separated from
the surface, on a permanent basis of value and title, with as full
protection to the grantee as if he had a fee simple title in technical
form. The case referred to is Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Penna. State
Reports 475, decided first in 1855. The questions came before the
court and were reargued twice. Justice Woodward, who decided
the first case, came from the coal regions. He was of a family
famous in the law and on the bench, for sound learning, clear
thought and wise forecast. The facts of that case are the follow-
ing:
The action itself was trespass and it involved the title to the coal,
the taking of which constituted the trespass. Caldwell, the ancestor
of the plaintiff, was the owner of the locus in quo. In 1831 Cald-
well conveyed to one Greer, sixteen acres, a tract lying on the
Youghiogheny river; and "also, the full right, title and privilege of
digging and taking away stone coal, to any extent the said Greer
may think proper to do, or cause to be done, under any of the land
now owned and occupied by the said Caldwell; provided, neverthe-
less, the entrance thereto, and the discharge therefrom be on the
foregoing described premises" (the sixteen acres). The deed
acknowledged a consideration of one thousand eight hundred dol-
lars, describing by metes and bounds two tracts (the sixteen acres),
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and then grants the coal in the terms above quoted. The habendum
called the property conveyed "two lots or parcels of land" and the
"aforesaid right to the stone coal," and is repeated in the covenant
of warranty. Greer and wife subsequently conveyed an undivided
half of the premises to one Case; Case to Bell; Greer also con-
veyed the other undivided half to McCune. Bell and McCune made
partition according to agreed lines of the sixteen acres and the coal.
McCune leased to Fulton in 1852, and it was the entry upon the coal
under this lease for which suit was brought.
The court below was at a loss whether to denominate the grant
of coal in Caldwell's deed to Greer, a common in gross, or appurte-
nant, or a license, but was clear that it was not an absolute grant of
all the coal under plaintiff's land. The question also arose in the
court above whether it was a corporeal or incorporeal hereditament.
For, if it was incorporeal a division of it by the deed of Greer was
not possible and extinguished the title in Greer, and his grantee.
The court met all these questions, reviewing the English cases, and
decided that it was a corporeal hereditament, and reversed the court
below and construed the grant to be a fee simple.
On the second argument of the case in 1858, which was designed
to review the case of 1855, Strong, Justice, enters again into the full
discussion of the principles involved, and under the emphatic state-
ment that "Coal and minerals in place are land" and therefore a cor-
poreal hereditament, holds that the coal may be conveyed as such,
and the title to the coal may be in one person, and to the surface in
another, and each hold a fee simple. In England, owing to the doc-
trine or livery of seisin and the impossibility of making livery of
coal below the surface, a difficulty arose in the minds of the judges,
but in this country it was solved because the recording of the deed
takes the place of livery.
A few quotations from the early discussion will make the trend
of the American discussion clear. In the case cited under the agree-
ment, Woodward, Judge, says: "A license it cannot be. The form
of the conveyance excludes that. Because a mere license to enjoy
a privilege in land is not an estate therein; it may be granted with-
out deed, and even without writing, notwithstanding the statute of
frauds. But here an estate or interest was evidently intended to be
conveyed and it must have been either a corporeal or incorporeal her-
cditament. If incorporeal I agree it was not divisible. . . . An
exclusive right to all the coal to be taken, without limitation except
as to the point of ingress and egress, is a sale of the coal itself; and
there is nothing incorporeal about coal. It is included in the defini-
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tion of land." In the same decision of 1858, same case, Strong, J.
(Yale 1828), says: "Coal and minerals in place are land. Nothing
is more common in Pennsylvania than that the surface right should
be in one man and the mineral right in another. . . . Both hold-
ers of a corporeal hereditament." Through a long line of decisions
down to as late as Sanderson v. Railroad Co., io9 Pa. St. 589,
when the attempt was made by two arguments to shake the uniform-
ity of the rule, the same rule of construction has been maintained in
the following words: "When the parties omit to name a term, do
not create a lease at will, nor a lease for life, though much of their
contract is expressed in words familiar to a lease, the whole instru-
ment must be taken into view to ascertain the intent."
Notwithstanding the clear reasoning and emphatic conclusive-
ness found in the case of Caldwell v. Fulton, the zeal of counsel for
their clients in repeated instances endeavored to shake the minds of
the judiciary from time to time by presenting nice distinctions. The
only result was that, with the rule that the intention of the parties
was always to govern in determining the quantum of estate, the
court laid down the principle as a controlling guide to construction,
that where the instrument of writing was a sale of all the coal,
exclusive in the vendee, it became a severance of the coal from the
surface, and vested an absolute title in the vendee. And these two
facts were to be gathered from the whole instrument. All natural
deductions follow this kind of title. Vendee is liable for taxes on
the coal; he may control the space left for gangways to transport
coal through it from other lands, at least until the time of exhaustion
of his own lands; and all logical deductions characteristic of a fee
simple title.
During the Civil War when the income tax was laid, the decision
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who was a lawyer and
understood the Pennsylvania law as to coal, gave instructions that
under such conveyances the royalty received was consideration
money for the sale of land, and was not to be considered as income
or rent, although called rent in the lease and payable by the ton
mined.
Out of the development of the coal interest there naturally grew
the interest which the railroads have taken in securing for them-
selves a permanent and continuous business for their roads, at an
early time when freight was scarce, and railroad investments not
attractive, and earnings were low. A little history is pertinent here.
In 1814 the Legislature of Pennsylvania granted a charter to the
Eeliizh Coal & Navigation Company to create a Slack Water Navi-
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gation of the Lehigh river. This developed by legislation into a
coal carrying company, ownership of coal lands and mining of coal
and selling in the markets of the country. In 1824 a charter was
granted to Maurice Wurts to improve the navigation of the Lack-
awaxen river, which subsequently emerged into the Delaware &
Hudson Canal Company, a corporation of the state of New York,
recognized by the state of Pennsylvania, authorized to hold coal
lands, mine, sell and carry coal to market. This company connected
the coal fields of the Northern Anthracite region with the Hudson
river and New York city. This is an interesting fact, if any attempt
is made to curb vested rights of public carrying companies and
exclude them from transporting their own products to the markets
of the several states of the Union. These were the beginnings of
the railroad and other corporate interests in the Anthracite coal
fields. It soon developed into a popular and legislative idea and
expression that the interest of Pennsylvania was to encourage the
development of the coal fields, both Anthracite and Bituminous, by
granting charters to railroad and other public corporations, with the
right to mine and sell coal in the markets. The railroads also
found that the steady furnishing of an article becoming more and
more a necessity for home comfort, and varied business and manu-
facturing interests, gave stability and strength to the freight traffic.
In fact, some of the railroads were expressly built for this kind of
freight, and between the desires of the people to promote industries
on the line, and the inviting prospect presented to the railroads,
some of them were lifted out of bankruptcy, and prosperity was
widespread. The railroads in course of time controlled the traffic
more or less, and a kind of monopoly was created, not so much
against the purchasers and consumers of coal, as against the indi-
vidual owners of coal land desirous of a market which they could
not reach, and for which the railroads stood in their way. As a
result of this state of affairs, when the Constitutional Convention of
1873 was called, one of the things sought was to break this monop-
oly. It was found by this Convention that this could not legally be
done- The grants in the railroad charters had become vested rights
of contract. In this dilemma a committee of the Convention called
on officers of the railroad companies to ascertain if some plan could
not be devised to secure the consent of the railroads to a modifica-
tion of this vested right. Of course this could not be done. Dur-
ing one of the consultations the writer was present. It was sug-
gested that the only method of breaking a vested monopoly was to
make it general and open the same privileges to the general public.
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Another evil to be remedied by the Convention was the great
mass of special charters, which had been granted by and were
sought at each session of the legislature. This was met by provid-
ing by general laws, for all classes of corporations, mining and rail-
roads included. An examination of the Constitution of 1873 of
Pennsylvania shows that while it provided that "no" (future)
"incorporated company doing the business of a common carrier
shall engage in mining or manufacturing articles for transporta-
tion over its works," nevertheless it did provide that "any mining or
manufacturing company may carry the products of its mines or
manufactories on its railroad or canal, not exceeding fifty miles in
length." These provisions, as subsequent events show, relieved the
owners of lands to a great extent, if not entirely from the monopoly
which existed against them.
It is interesting to study the result of this legislation in the
growth and prosperity of the state. It is'not presumed that it is all
due to the breaking of this one kind of monopoly, and it is only
suggested as a possible clue to the breaking of other monopolies
intrenched under vested rights so as to rob them of much, if not all
their evils. In the year 1870 (census) the amount of
Bituminous coal marketed in Pennsylvania was .............. 7,798,517 tons
Anthracite coal marketed was ............................... 15,650,275 tons
i9o5 the Bituminous coal marketed was ...................... 119,361,514 tons
i9o5 Anthracite coal marketed was .......................... 78,647,020 tons
In each decade since i870 the population of Pennsylvania has
increased about one million. It is not claimed that these statistics
are anything more than to illustrate a factor which largely relieved
in its outcome the monopoly complained of in i87o. As early as
1839 Jessup, P. J. (Yale 1815) decided that the lateral railroad act
of 1832 which authorized the building of a railroad with right of
eminent domain, using private property for a private use, in order to
connect individual mines with public transportation companies, was
constitutional. One of the grounds for this decision is "that the
mining of coal was of public interest." The judgment of the lower
court was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following words of
Gibson, C. J.: "Pennsylvania has an incalculable interest in her coal
mines; nor will it be alleged that the incorporation of railroad com-
panies for the development of her resources, in this or any other
particular would not be a measure of public utility." For cases in
other states approving of this decision see Am. Dec., Volume 36,
page 144.
A new question is now arising and demanding public attention,
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and in one of its aspects it is germane to the subject we have been
treating, viz., the monopoly in the coal trade itself, in connection
with another evil of discrimination in rates of freight. It is not pre-
sented as a clear-cut and single issue and is therefore not free
from difficulties which otherwise would be more easy of solution.
Unfortunately the prosperity of the country for many years, and the
haste to be suddenly rich, have led not one class of corporations, but
different classes, to enter upon a method of business unjustified even
by a desire of increased and legitimate profits. It has created a
frenzy almost as bad as "frenzied finance," and rests in the public
mind with no clear apprehension as to the wise method to take to
remedy it. The real thing to be reached is almost entirely monopo-
listic injustice in all kinds of corporate management. Rascality
can always be legally reached in this country in the long run, and is
as widely different from a monopoly which has become a "vested
right," under the meaning of the Constitution of state and national
laws, as a legal right is from an absolute wrong. The serious ques-
tion proper for cautious consideration, difficult as it is, is that which
is raised by the suggestion that no common carrier shall be allowed
to carry as freight its own goods and products, and this to take the
form of legislation by the national government, reaching to the past
as well as the future. It is proposed to reach this through the
power given to the United States to "regulate commerce," and
deprive railroads of all vested rights to carry their own products,
outside of the state of their incorporation. It is possible, unfortu-
nately, that it may become a political question. It certainly is a
legal one. It is not the purpose of this article to give a legal opin-
ion in the matter. It may be asserted, however, that under the
Dartmouth College case the result sought by retroaction cannot be
reached without a legal struggle as famous as that case, with a pos-
sible unhinging of principles as sacred as they are useful, settled by
that case. The question is not merely legal; it is to a certain extent
social, and possibly revolutionary. Notwithstanding all that may
be said of the evils which have existed in connection with corporate
action in this respect, it has not been an unmixed evil. Principles
of constitutional and fundamental law well considered, under which
safety anI p osperity have arisen, must appeal to the legal mind to
offer a word of caution. The question also has another aspect than
a legal one, viz., whether any success in destroying a vested right
in public corporations to sell their product in any market does not
introduce an evil. The owner of the coal now sells it, as sometimes
the farmer, his product to the carrying company at his own door.
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He is not obliged to seek his customer, nor his pay in Montreal or
New Orleans. The purchaser in New Orleans is not obliged to seek
Pennsylvania for his purchase. Also, does the Constitutional ques-
tion to regulate commerce between the states mean to destroy it in
any sense, as it has arisen through the century under legislative
purpose to promote the welfare and mutual prosperity between the
states. This subject is germane to the matter treated in the first
part of this article, because it was through the settlement of the
titles through judicial action on a distinct and permanent basis that
the railroads under legislative sanction acquired any monopoly in
that product. Their contracts are unique and beneficial to both
parties. Whatever evils exist to-day in corporate action which
has resulted in the "Trusts" and the stifling of competition, in
rebates and reduction of price to favored customers, are not due to
the fact that transportation companies own their transported
product. Even if it were, it is competent, by the scientific methods
of modem individual business to ascertain the facts and learn the
exact normal market price of any product and its freight charge.
Under the outcome of the Coal Commission what do we have,-
brought about by the initiative of the executive? We have one
man ascertaining to a cent the average market value of coal at tide-
water and exactly regulating the price up or down to be paid as the
wages of the miner. In this view there can be no question in regard
to the government having the legal and practical power, under regu-
lating commerce, to regulate freight rates, and prevent rebates
under a false price for coal which is not the market price. This can
be done outside of politics, and within the realm of commercial
exactitude and under proper regulations of control through the
department of commerce and labor. Why, under the power to
regulate commerce, should the Constitution be strained to unbalance
business methods which have grown up, bringing prosperity and
convenience to the whole country and in a direction that violates the
sanctity of contracts and unsettles business, when the same goal may
be reached by a wiser course? The simple fact that some corpora-
tions have a right to carry their own product to market, which has
become vested, is not the evil,-if it be an evil,-that society is aim-
ing at. The evil to-day is graft, discrimination, rebates to hide dis-
crimination. The investigation already made shows it did not hide
discrimination, and the law can correct that, without violating or
altering the Constitution under one of the most sacred principles,
the inviolability of contracts by state or national legislation. A
careful study at this day of the Dartmouth College case is worth the
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effort. The sound principles there enunciated and their far-reach-
ing influence on all the varied commercial and corporate interests of
the country, as well as those interests which concern individual
safety and property rights, cannot be ignored.
The writer has no personal interest in this question other than
any other citizen. He has taken no brief on the subject-is not
interested as a stockholder, or officer or counsel in that line. The
wisdom of the wisest it is deemed is able to reach a solution that will
bring no dangerous collision of classes on the subject, or jeopardize
settled lines of business and prosperity. Alfred Hand,
Justice of Supreme Court of Penn.
